Sane or Insane-Common sense is not so Common

After the head of one house used such words for the head of another house, the world is in deep trouble. Hopefully all this hate projected and injected will not last as long as Methuselah which life span according to Bible was 969 years. Some months maybe, but it would be enough for great many of us to dissappear. It all started with the thoughts that WE ARE EXCEPTIONAL WE ARE EMPIRE! That has a cost. Then it went personal, from one side to reach the other. Why? Well still even after personal insults the reply we hear is as much as possible polite leaving bridge still to be walkable. “Peskov – about Biden’s insulting words: “These statements are personal insults.  Given Biden’s irritability, fatigue and forgetfulness, we will not give harsh assessments so as not to cause more aggressiveness.” They think about EARTH! That has come from inside!

But the costs are high with financing BIOLABS https://news.am/eng/news/690459.html, and bombings of so many countries around the world, with poor Yemen bombings to still continue killing innocent women and children. But they are not of interest for the Empires perversed rullers. Actually they are not of interest of some that would like to call themselves Empire. Those narcissistic hypocrites which are driven by impulses and not by idea of building something to last. However the majority of us left are ordinary peace loving people practicing togetherness!

Those two men from the photo above had very fruitfull and respectful cooperation and exchanged many letters while having also a couple of personal meetings. They were united in fighting Fascists and Nazis. Even, as correctly, one of the readers pointed out, Stalin thought that Roosevelt sudden death was the product of poisoning and wanted to send his ambassador Gromyko to see the dead body of Roosevelt but was denied by his wife Eleanor. Gromyko later became Soviet Union longest serving foreign minister, meeting todays tenant of the house.

Interesting greetings

There is a book published in 1960s that has their(Roosevelt and Stalin)exchange of letters, most confidential and personal.

In those letters trust permeates, together with respect and determination to win the war against Fascist and Nazis and to make the world a better place for cooperation by practicing simple togetherness. All differences were solved by mutual understanding, as there is always a way when you are open minded, understanding each other concerns. That atmosphere was transferred to vast majority of the people of both countries including both Armies.

Soviet and American Army in Germany 1945

Here are few letters to see how positive attitude it was and compare it with today’s.

“F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN* SECRET AND PERSONAL

In reply to your message of February 16 in which you set forth certain considerations that you had transmitted to Mr Churchill in reply to his message of February 12 to you, I desire to state that I share your regret that the Allied effort in North Africa did not proceed in accordance with the schedule. It was interrupted by unexpected heavy rains that made the roads extremely difficult for both supplies and troops proceeding to the front lines from our landing ports. These rains made the fields and mountains impassable.

I am fully aware of the adverse effect on the common Allied effort of this delay and I am taking every possible step to begin successful aggressive action against the forces of the Axis in Africa at the earliest possible moment with the purpose of accomplishing their destruction.

The wide dispersion of America’s transportation facilities at the present time is well known by you and I can assure you that a maximum effort to increase our transportation is being made.

I understand the importance of a military effort on the continent of Europe at the earliest date practicable in order to reduce Axis resistance to your heroic army. You may be sure that the American war effort will be projected on to the European Continent at as early a date subsequent to success in North Africa as transportation facilities can be provided by our maximum effort.

We wish for the continuance of the success of your heroic army which is an inspiration to all of us.

February 22, 1943


Received on February 23, 1943

F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN*

On behalf of the people of the United States I want to express to the Red Army on its twenty-fifth anniversary our profound admiration for its magnificent achievements unsurpassed in all history. For many months in spite of many tremendous losses in supplies, transportation and territory the Red Army denied victory to a most powerful enemy. It checked him at Leningrad, at Moscow, at Voronezh, in the Caucasus and finally at the immortal battle of Stalingrad the Red Army not only defeated the enemy but launched the great offensive which is still moving forward along the whole front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The enforced retreat of the enemy is costing him heavily in men, supplies, territory and especially in morale. Such achievements can only be accomplished by an army that has skillful leadership, sound organization, adequate training and above all determination to defeat the enemy no matter what the cost in self-sacrifice. At the same time I also wish to pay tribute to the Russian people from whom the Red Army springs and upon whom it is dependent for its men, women and supplies. They, too, are giving their full efforts to the war and are making the supreme sacrifice. The Red Army and the Russian people have surely started the Hitler forces on the road to ultimate defeat and have earned the lasting admiration of the people of the United States.”

“F. ROOSEVELT TO J. V. STALIN*

My dear Mr Stalin,

I am sending this personal note to you by the hands of my old friend, Joseph E. Davies. It relates solely to one subject which I think it is easier for us to talk over through a mutual friend. Mr Litvinov is the only other person with whom I have talked about it.

I want to get away from the difficulties of large Staff conferences or the red tape of diplomatic conversations. Therefore, the simplest and most practical method that I can think of would be an informal and completely simple visit for a few days between you and me.

I fully appreciate the desirability for you to stay in daily touch with your military operations; I also find it inadvisable to be away from Washington more than a short time. There are two sides to the problem. The first relates to timing. There is always the possibility that the historic Russian defense, followed by taking the offensive, may cause a crack-up in Germany next winter. In such a case we must be prepared for the many next steps. We are none of us prepared today. Therefore, it is my belief that you and I ought to meet this summer.

The second problem is where to meet. Africa is almost out of the question in summer and Khartoum is British territory. Iceland I do not like because for both you and me it involves rather difficult flights and, in addition, would make it, quite frankly, difficult not to invite Prime Minister Churchill at the same time.

Therefore, I suggest that we could meet either on your side or my side of Bering Straits. Such a point would be about three days from Washington and I think about two days from Moscow if the weather is good. That means that you could always get back to Moscow in two days in an emergency.

It is my thought that neither of us would want to bring any Staff. I would be accompanied by Harry Hopkins, an interpreter and a stenographer—and that you and I would talk very informally and get what we call “a meeting of the minds.” I do not believe that any official agreements or declarations are in the least bit necessary.

You and I would, of course, talk over the military and naval situation, but I think we can both do that without Staffs being present.

Mr Davies has no knowledge of our military affairs nor of the post-war plans of this Government, and I am sending him to you for the sole purpose of talking over our meeting.

I greatly hope that our forces will be in complete control of Tunisia by the end of May, and Churchill and I next week will be working on the second phase of the offensive.

Our estimates of the situation are that Germany will deliver an all-out attack on you this summer, and my Staff people think it will be directed against the middle of your line.

You are doing a grand job. Good luck!

Always sincerely,

Franklin D. ROOSEVELT

May 6, 1943″

“FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

Washington

I congratulate you and the gallant U.S. and British troops on the brilliant victory which has resulted in the liberation of Bi-zerta and Tunis from Hitler tyranny. I wish you further success.

J. STALIN”

“J. V. STALIN TO F. ROOSEVELT*

My dear Mr Roosevelt,

Mr Davies has delivered your message to me.

I agree that this summer—possibly as early as June—we should expect the Hitlerites to launch a new major offensive on the Soviet-German front. Hitler has already concentrated about 200 German divisions and up to 30 divisions of his allies for use against us. We are getting ready to repel the new German offensive and to launch counter-attacks, but we are short of aircraft and aircraft fuel. Of course, it is at the moment impossible to foresee all the military and other steps that we may have to take. That will depend on the course of events on our front. A good deal will also depend on the speed and vigour with which Anglo-American military operations are launched in Europe.

I have mentioned these important circumstances to explain why my reply to your suggestion for a meeting between us cannot be quite specific as yet.

I agree that the time is ripe for such a meeting and that it should not be delayed. But I beg you to assess properly the importance of the circumstances I have referred to, because the summer months will be exceedingly trying for the Soviet armies. As I do not know how events will develop on the Soviet-German front in June, I shall not be able to leave Moscow during that month. I therefore suggest holding the meeting in July or August. If you agree, I shall let you know two weeks before the date of the meeting just when it could be held in July or August. If, after being notified by me, you agree to the date suggested, I could arrive in time.

Mr Davies will personally inform you of the meeting place.

I agree with you about cutting down the number of your advisers and mine.

Thank you for sending Mr Davies to Moscow, a man familiar with the Soviet Union and who can pass impartial judgment on things.

Yours very sincerely,

J. STALIN

May 26, 1943″

And a couple of letters before the death of great man President Roosevelt.

“Received on March 25, 1945

PERSONAL AND SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

The State Department has just been informed by Ambassador Gromyko concerning the composition of the Soviet Delegation to the San Francisco Conference. We have the highest regard for Ambassador Gromyko’s character and capabilities and know that he would ably represent the Soviet Union. Nevertheless I cannot help but be deeply disappointed that Mr Molotov apparently does not plan to attend. Recalling the friendly and fruitful cooperation at Yalta between Mr Molotov, Mr Eden and Mr Stettinius, I know that the Secretary of State has been looking forward to continuing at San Francisco in the same spirit the joint work for the eventual realization of our common goal—the establishment of an effective international organization to insure for the world a secure and peaceful future.

The Conference, without Mr Molotov’s presence, will be deprived of a very great asset. If his pressing and heavy responsibilities in the Soviet Union make it impossible for him to stay for the entire Conference, I hope very much that you will find it possible to let him come at least for the vital opening sessions. All sponsoring Powers and the majority of the other countries attending will be represented by their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In these circumstances I am afraid that Mr Molotov’s absence will be construed all over the world as a lack of comparable interest in the great objectives of this Conference on the part of the Soviet Government.


PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET FOR MARSHAL STALIN FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

Ambassador Harriman has communicated to me a letter which he has received from Mr Molotov regarding an investigation being made by Field Marshal Alexander into a reported possibility of obtaining the surrender of part or all of the German army in Italy. In this letter Mr Molotov demands that, because of the non-participation therein of Soviet officers, this investigation to be undertaken in Switzerland should be stopped forthwith.

The facts of this matter I am sure have, through a misunderstanding, not been correctly presented to you. The following are the facts:

Unconfirmed information was received some days ago in Switzerland that some German officers were considering the possibility of arranging for the surrender of German troops that are opposed to Field Marshal Alexander’s British-American Armies in Italy.

Upon the receipt of this information in Washington, Field Marshal Alexander was authorized to send to Switzerland an officer or officers of his staff to ascertain the accuracy of the report and if it appeared to be of sufficient promise to arrange with any competent German officers for a conference to discuss details of the surrender with Field Marshal Alexander at his headquarters in Italy. If such a meeting could be arranged Soviet representatives would, of course, be welcome.

Information concerning this investigation to be made in Switzerland was immediately communicated to the Soviet Government. Your Government was later informed that it will be agreeable for Soviet officers to be present at Field Marshal Alexander’s meetings with German officers if and when arrangements are finally made in Berne for such a meeting at Caserta to discuss details of a surrender.

Up to the present time the attempts by our representatives to arrange a meeting with German officers have met with no success, but it still appears that such a meeting is a possibility.

My Government, as you will of course understand, must give every assistance to all officers in the field in command of Allied forces who believe there is a possibility of forcing the surrender of enemy troops in their area. For me to take any other attitude or to permit any delay which must cause additional and avoidable loss of life in the American forces would be completely unreasonable. As a military man you will understand the necessity for prompt action to avoid losing an opportunity. The sending of a flag of truce to your General at Konigsberg or Danzig would be in the same category.

There can be in such a surrender of enemy forces in the field no violation of our agreed principle of unconditional surrender and no political implications whatever. I will be pleased to have at any discussion of the details of surrender by our commander of American forces in the field the benefit of the experience and advice of any of your officers who can be present, but I cannot agree to suspend investigation of the possibility because of objection by Mr Molotov for some reason completely beyond my comprehension.

Not much is expected from the reported possibility, but for the purpose of preventing misunderstanding between our officers, I hope you will point out to the Soviet officials concerned the desirability and necessity of our taking prompt and effective action without any delay to effect the surrender of any enemy military forces that are opposed to American forces in the field.

I feel certain that you will have the same attitude and will take the same action when a similar opportunity comes on the Soviet front.


PERSONAL AND SECRET FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN
TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT

We highly value and attach great importance to the San Francisco Conference to lay the foundations of an international organisation for peace and security of the nations, but present circumstances preclude V. M. Molotov’s attendance. I and Molotov are very sorry about this, but the convening, at the instance of Deputies to the Supreme Soviet, of a session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in April, at which Mo-lotov’s attendance is imperative, makes it impossible for him to attend even the opening session of the Conference.

You are aware that Ambassador Gromyko successfully coped with his task at Dumbarton Oaks, and we are certain that he will ably head the Soviet Delegation at San Francisco.

As to the different interpretations, you will appreciate that they cannot determine the decisions to be taken.


PERSONAL AND SECRET
FROM PREMIER J. V. STALIN TO THE PRESIDENT, Mr F. ROOSEVELT

I have analysed the matter raised in your letter of March 25, and find that the Soviet Government could not have given any other reply after its representatives were barred from the Berne negotiations with the Germans for a German surrender and opening the front to the Anglo-American troops in Northern Italy.

Far from being against, I am all for profiting from cases of disintegration in the German armies to hasten their surrender on one or another sector and encourage them to open the front to Allied forces.

But I agree to such talks with the enemy only in cases where they do not lead to an easing of the enemy’s position, if the opportunity for the Germans to manoeuvre and to use the talks for switching troops to other sectors, above all to the Soviet front, is precluded.

And it was solely with an eye to providing this guarantee that the Soviet Government found it necessary to have representatives of its Military Command take part in such negotiations with the enemy wherever they might take place—whether in Berne or in Caserta. I cannot understand why the representatives of the Soviet Command have been excluded from the talks and in what way they could have handicapped

the representatives of the Allied Command.

I must tell you for your information that the Germans have already taken advantage of the talks with the Allied Command to move three divisions from Northern Italy to the Soviet front. The task of coordinated operations involving a blow at the Germans from the West, South and East, proclaimed at the Crimea Conference, is to hold the enemy on the spot and prevent him from manoeuvring, from moving his forces to the points where he needs them most. The Soviet Command is doing this. But Field Marshal Alexander is not. This circumstance irritates the Soviet Command and engenders distrust.

“As a military man,” you write to me, “you will understand the necessity for prompt action to avoid losing an opportunity. The sending of a flag of truce to your General at Konigsberg or Danzig would be in the same category.” I am afraid the analogy does not fit the case. The German troops at Danzig and at Konigsberg are encircled. If they surrender they will do so to escape extermination, but they cannot open the front to Soviet troops because the front has shifted as far west as the Oder. The German troops in Northern Italy are in an entirely different position. They are not encircled and are not faced with extermination. If, nevertheless, the Germans in Northern Italy seek negotiations in order to surrender and to open the front to the Allied troops, then they must have some other, more far-reaching aims affecting the destiny of Germany.

I must tell you that if a similar situation had obtained on the Eastern Front, somewhere on the Oder, providing an opportunity for a German surrender and for the opening of the front to the Soviet troops, I should have immediately notified the Anglo-American Military Command and asked it to send its representatives to take part in the talks, for in a situation of this kind Allies should have nothing to conceal from each other.

March 29, 1945″

It is a little too much but still it shows the magnitude of relation and understanding of each one interests.

It looks like that the forces which were “Conjuring Hitler”( book by Guido Giacomo Preparata) in the USA and Britain did not want the relationship with Soviet Union to grow. In that they had collaborators and secret alies from the Soviet Union side as both military industrial complex were exited and drunk from the vision of power and money they would make and the control over the destinies of the people they would have. That was the real conspiratory empire in making. Those are the real fifth column of the world. Those are the real destroyers of the world development and inventors of higher grade manipulation techniques. Including infections and wars! They employed so many useful idiots that you can see every moment infront of your cameras, that are projecting hate, fear and destruction instead of cooperation and understanding of each other concerns.

About Conspiracy Practitioners you can read in the eBook Quarantine Diaries and Beyond here Quarantine Diaries and Beyond eBook

To be continued

The letters of Stalin and Roosevelt were taken from the web site http://marxsist.org which I thank warmly!

18/3/2022

Darko Richard Lancelot

Philosophyofgoodnews.com

Connect and Respect

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